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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 782a-3(2)G) of the Utah Code.

ISSUES OF REVIEW
1. Was the trial court correct when it granted the defendant's motion for j.n.o.v.
and ruled that there was no competent evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant
was negligent when he began to fall while skiing, and that defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it conditionally granted defendant's
motion for a new trial when the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff was against the great
weight of the evidence?
3. Did the trial court err when it excluded the defendant's expert testimony
concerning the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of
this case?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. On an appeal for the grant of a motion for j.n.o.v. the proper standard of
review is the same standard as used by the trial court. Gold Standard. Inc. v. Getty Oil Co..
915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v. a trial court has no
latitude and must be correct. Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp.. 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah
1996)(quotations omitted). Furthermore, "the trial court is justified in granting a j.n.o.v. only
1

if, after looking at the evidence and all of its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, the trial court concludes that there is no competent evidence to support a
verdict in the nonmoving party's favor." id. Therefore, an appellate court "must review the
record and determine whether there is any basis in the evidence, including reasonable
inferences which could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination. . . ." Jd.
2. "A ruling on a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal except
when there is a clear or manifest abuse of discretion." Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1001 (quoting
Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973)). An appellate court presumes that the
discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary. Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). When a trial court grants
a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court will sustain a trial court's
ruling when there is "substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict for the
moving party." Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1001.
3. On an appeal of the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony, an appellate
court reviews whether the trial court abused its discretion. Steffensen v. Smith's Management
Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). The burden is on the complaining party to prove
that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the trial court
had allowed the expert testimony." Id.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES OR RULES
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for j.n.o.v. Rule
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for new trials. The text of those
rules is set out in Appellant's addendum. Provisions from the Skier's Responsibility Code that
are relevant to this case are set forth in the addendum of this brief. Utah's "Inherent Risk of
Skiing" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51 et. seq. (1997), is also included in the addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Court Below
This case is an action to recover for personal injuries the plaintiff, Gary Ricci

("Ricci"), sustained because of ski a accident at Snowbird Ski Resort in Salt Lake County,
Utah. Ricci alleged that the defendant, Charles Shoultz1 ("Shoultz") was negligent when
Shoultz, who was 20 feet in front and 10 feet to the left of Ricci, lost control of his skis and
fell into Ricci's path as the two skiers were skiing on a run called "Anderson Hill." (R. 58687, 605).
The case was tried to a jury on March 11, 12, and 13, 1996. (R. 150-51, 209).
Prior to trial, the trial court excluded expert testimony by Snowbird employees regarding the
cause of the accident and the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code.
(R. 442). The court only allowed testimony that the code was posted and published by
1

The pleadings in this case misspell Appellee's name. This brief will use the
proper spelling.
3

Snowbird Ski Resort and an instruction was given to the jury concerning the code. (R. 442,
793).
The case then proceeded to trial before the jury. After the parties rested, Shoultz
properly moved for a directed verdict. (R. 838-39). The trial court denied the motion and
allowed the case to go to the jury. (R. 842). The jury returned a special verdict. It found
that Shoultz was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries. It found that Ricci was also negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate
cause of his injuries. The jury awarded the plaintiff $16,458.84 for past medical expenses,
$12,579.00 for past lost income and $100,000.00 for lost future income or loss of earning
capacity, for a total award of $129,037.84. (R. 244-46). A judgment was entered in favor of
Ricci and against Shoultz for $134,769.04, which included $5,731.20 in prejudgment interest.
(R. 270-72).
Shoultz filed a motion for j.n.o.v., or alternatively for a new trial or for remittitur,
on the grounds that (1) the jury's finding that Shoultz was negligent was contrary to the
evidence and against the law; (2) the jury's finding that Ricci's negligence was not a proximate
cause of his injuries was contrary to the evidence and against the law; (3) the trial court erred
in excluding expert testimony regarding the skier's responsibility code; and (4) the award of
$12,579.00 for past lost wages was against the law because it was based on lost gross income,
not net income. (R. 273-87).

4

At the hearing on Shoultz's motion, the trial court rejected Shoultz's arguments
based on the exclusion of expert testimony and the alleged inconsistency in the jury's finding
that the plaintiff was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of his
injuries. (R. 340-42). With respect to the exclusion of Shoultz's expert testimony, the court
stated:
I know that the experts, to my knowledge, they came in, and the first
knowledge that was given to [plaintiffs counsel] that they were going to
testify as experts. And [plaintiffs counsel] had not been given any notice
of the same.
The court felt he was entitled to have notice of expert witnesses, and
entitled to find his own experts if he chose to do so, which he didn't have
time.
(R. 341).
The trail court, however, granted Shoultz's motion for j.n.o.v. With respect to
that ruling, the court stated:
And the only time this court is going to disturb a jury verdict is where I
feel I have a duty and a responsibility so to do, in a case where the jury
completely missed the situation. And, as I say, that's something this
court does not like to do, unless the court feels like its's such a case that
I would be derelict in my duty if I did not do so.
And, in this case, I feel that. I felt, at the time the jury brought the
verdict back, that they were dead wrong. I felt, during the course of the
trial, that there was no cause of action.
I've read your memorandums, and I'm still of the same opinion — even
persuaded more — that there was no duty owed to the plaintiff. And —
maybe I should correct that: there was a duty not to be negligent. But
there was no negligence on the part of the defendant in this case, and
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negligence, if any, was on the part of [Ricci] and his failure to ski under
control in consistency with the skier's code.
(R. 342).
Shoultz submitted a proposed order granting his motion for a j.n.o.v. and
conditionally granting his motion for a new trial, and Ricci objected to the proposed order.
(R. 346-47, 350-51, 363-69). Following a hearing on the plaintiffs objections, the court
signed Shoultz's proposed order but struck the paragraph conditionally granting a new trial.
(R. 379, 383-85). The court later called counsel and indicated that it was amending its prior
ruling to conditionally grant Shoultz's motion for a new trial. (R. 396-97). Following another
hearing, the court denied Ricci's objection to the proposed modification and entered an
amended order nunc pro tunc conditionally granting Shoultz's motion for a new trial. (R. 399401).
Ricci has appealed the trial court's order granting Shoultz a j.n.o.v. and
conditionally granting Shoultz's motion for a new trial. (R. 392). Shoultz has filed a crossappeal on the basis that should the appellate court reverse on the ruling of j.n.o.v. and
consider the new trial grant, the trial court erred when it refused to allow Shoultz to call
expert witnesses regarding the applicability and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility
Code. (R. 404).
B.

Statement of Facts
The appellant, Gary Ricci ("Ricci"), is a self-described "highly advanced expert

skier" and has been skiing for seventeen years. (R. 550, 553). The appellee, Charles Shoultz
6

("Shoultz"), is an "advanced/intermediate" skier and has skied for approximately seven years.
(R. 796, 815). On April 12, 1994, Ricci and Shoultz were involved in a ski accident at
Snowbird Ski Resort on a run known as "Anderson's Hill." (R. 556).
Anderson Hill is considered quite steep. At the bottom, however, it flattens out
into a "runout." (R. 569). There is a slight rise near the end of the runout. (R. 581-582). As
skiers reach the runout, they customarily straighten out their path to maintain their speed so as
to make it over that flat portion. (R. 580-81). On the day of the accident, the snow conditions
were "basic spring morning." This means that the snow had melted during the day and froze
during the night. Therefore, the snow was hard and smooth on the catted2 or groomed
surface. (R. 565, 663).
Ricci, upon approaching the top of Anderson Hill, saw a group of skiers skiing in
the middle and catted portion of the bowl approximately 100 feet in front of him. (R. 570).
This group was a ski class of which Shoultz was a member. (R. 822). The skiers, at the
request of the instructor, Karl Boyer ("Boyer"), were making small turns in the catted portion
of the bowl as they were descending. (R.571, 828). Ricci began to descend the hill on the left
side of the catted portion. (R. 571). As Ricci approached the middle of the hill, he was
approximately 75 feet behind the ski class and 10-15 feet to their left. (R. 666-67). Upon
reaching the bottom of the hill which flattens out into a runout, Ricci was 20 feet behind and
10 feet to the left of Shoultz. (R. 587). Both skiers were traveling at approximately 20 miles2

A ski run is "catted" by a tractor-type machine that rolls over the snow and
smooths out the terrain, making it easier to ski. (R. 565).
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per-hour and were on a straight path. (R. 586-87). Ricci had no reason to believe that
Shoultz knew Ricci was coming up behind him and did not observe anything about the way
Shoultz was skiing that caused him any concern prior to the accident. (R. 588, 672).
Likewise, Shoultz did not know that Ricci was behind and to the left of him. (R. 809).
Ricci stated that just as the runout begins to rise, he saw Shoultz having difficulty
with his skis. (R. 589). He claimed that Shoultz's skis "split at the tip" and then Shoultz
"caught an edge" on the snow. (R. 589). In other words, Shoultz's skis were no longer
planing on the surface of the snow. The left ski rolled over on an edge which caused Shoultz
to veer to his left and begin to fall. (R. 590, 668-69). As Shoultz was falling to his left, he
lost speed and the two skiers collided with Shoultz veering into Ricci's right hip and leg. (R
591). Ricci, too, swerved to his left in an attempt to avoid a collision. However, his efforts
were unsuccessful and the two skiers were forced into the trees off the edge of the trail. (R.
593, 669-70). In sum, Ricci claimed that two seconds prior to the collision, Shoultz was in
control; and one second prior, he "caught an edge" and was not in control. (R. 589, 605).
At trial, Shoultz gave a different version of the accident. Shoultz testified that he
was skiing straight in the runout and approaching his ski instructor and another ski-class
member at an approximate speed of 5 m.p.h. (R. 810). Shoultz was halfway through the
runout when, without warning, he was hit from behind and knocked toward his left and off the
trail. (R. 806). Therefore, Ricci struck Shoultz from behind on the backside of his right
thigh. (R. 807). That collision caused Shoultz to veer off the trail and into a tree. Shoultz hit
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the tree with his shoulders. (R. 811). Shoultz testified that just prior to the collision, he did
not begin to fall and did not catch an edge. (R. 810).
Evidence was introduced of the Skier's Responsibility Code. That code is a well
publicized list of rules that is put together by the National Ski Area Association. Nearly all ski
resorts in the United States use it as a sort of "rules of the road." (R. 331). Snowbird
publishes the code on its "Skier's Guide" and also posts it at the base of the ski lifts and some
ticket sales locations. (R. 794). In part, the code provides:
(1) Ski under control and in such a manner that you can stop or avoid
other skiers or objects.
(2) When skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid the
skier below you.
(R. 602, 606). In order for Ricci to obtain a Snowbird Season ski pass, he had to sign an
agreement in which he stated that he understood the code and would abide by it. (R. 436).
Prior to trial, the trial court excluded expert testimony by Snowbird employees,
particularly Bob Bonar ("Bonar"), Snowbird's mountain operations manager, regarding the
application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 442). The court only
allowed Bonar to testify that the code was posted and published by Snowbird Ski Resort. (R.
442, 793).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly granted Shoultz's motion for j.n.o.v. Even when the
evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Ricci), Shoultz is entitled

9

to judgment as a matter of law. That evidence merely shows that Shoultz accidentally caught
an edge on the snow and began to fall. When a person falls while skiing, he or she is not
negligent as a matter of law. (Point I).
If Shoultz is not entitled to j.n.o.v., then the trial court correctly granted Shoultz's
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Substantial
evidence was produced at trial to support a verdict in his favor and against Ricci. The
evidence showed that Shoultz was skiing straight through a runout at the bottom of a hill. He
was skiing at a speed of 5 m.p.h., did not catch an edge and did not begin to fall. Instead,
Ricci ran into Shoultz from behind on his right backside and forced him into the trees off the
trail. Likewise, evidence produced at trial showed that Ricci was either the "uphill" skier or
an "overtaking" skier, and violated the Skier's Responsibility Code when he failed to avoid
Shoultz as the "downhill" skier. Thus, there was evidence that Ricci's actions were the
proximate cause of his injuries which would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor. (Point II).
If the trial court erred in granting Shoultz a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then Shoultz is entitled to a new trial because the trial court
abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony concerning the application and
interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Handbook. Ricci possessed notice that those
witnesses would testify as experts, and proper foundation could have been laid for such
testimony. Had the trial court allowed the experts to testify, there is a substantial likelihood
that the verdict would have been different.

10

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SHOULTZ'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT.
A trial court properly grants a motion for a j.n.o.v. when the evidence is, as matter
of law, insufficient to support the jury verdict. Gold Standard. Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d
1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). Therefore, a trial court is justified in granting a j.n.o.v. if, after
looking at the evidence and all its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there is no competent evidence to support a verdict in favor of that party.
Id. In this case, Shoultz was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Even when all the
evidence presented at trial is considered in the light most favorable to Ricci, there was simply
no competent evidence to support a finding that Shoultz was negligent. Simply put, the
evidence merely showed that Shoultz fell while skiing, which is a regular, normal and
anticipated part of the sport.
A. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SHOULTZ WAS NOT
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IF HE FELL WHILE
SKIING.
In order to establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must establish that (1)
defendant owed plaintiff a duty; (2) defendant breached the duty; (3) the breach of the duty was
the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries; and (4) damages. See Cannon v. University of
Utah. 866 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993). The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a
question of law to be determined by the court. CT v. Martinez. 845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992).
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A plaintiff cannot recover in the absence of a showing of a duty. Rollins v. Peterson. 813 P.2d
1156, 1158 (Utah 1991).
In this case, Shoultz had a duty to ski in a reasonable manner as determined by the
totality of the circumstances. (See Jury Instruction No. 14 at R. 224). Ricci was held to that
same duty. At trial, Ricci testified that two seconds before the accident, Shoultz was in
control; one second prior to the accident, Shoultz "caught an edge" on the snow, lost control
and began to fall. (R. 589, 605). There was no evidence that Shoultz engaged in careless,
reckless or out-of-control skiing. Ricci testified at trial that Shoultz and his other class
members were not having any difficulty as they skied down the middle of Anderson Hill and
that all members were in control as they did so. (R. 572). Karl Boyer, Shoultz's ski
instructor, testified that throughout the day, Shoultz never exhibited any unsafe conduct while
skiing. (R. 822). Simply put, there is no evidence, even when it is viewed in a light most
favorable to Ricci, that shows Shoultz was engaging in any sort of activity that increased the
risk of him falling. See Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991)(Snowbird
employee jumped off of steep crest and landed on plaintiff's head; employee ignored sign
instructing skiers to ski slowly at that point and disregarded Snowbird ski patrol instructions
telling skiers not to jump off the crest); Freeman v. Hale. 30 Cal. App. 4h 1388
(1994)(defendant did not have a duty to avoid an inadvertent collision with plaintiff while
skiing but did have a duty to not increase that risk by consuming large quantities of alcohol
while skiing).
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The evidence presented in a light most favorable to Ricci shows the following.
The accident at issue in this case occurred on the easiest part of the mountain. The runout at
the bottom of Anderson Hill was "catted" or groomed snow. (R. 817, 827). The day was clear
and the weather was good. There was nothing in Shoultz's path to obstruct him. (R. 564-65,
604, 801, 829-30). Ricci testified that with his experience in skiing, if he was skiing on that
flat area of the run, he would not have "caught an edge" and fell if he was paying attention to
his skiing. (R. 678). Therefore, Ricci argues that there is competent evidence from which the
jury could conclude that Shoultz was negligent when he began to fall and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of Ricci's injuries.
Ricci's argument, while appealing, misses the point. In this case, there is no
evidence in the record that Shoultz was inattentive while he was skiing on the runout or on any
other portion of the mountain. Instead, the evidence shows that the opposite is true. Stripped
to its true form, Ricci's argument is that: Shoultz had a duty to not fall while skiing; because
Shoultz fell while skiing, he must have been negligent. Ricci's argument ignores the fact that
falling and inadvertent collisions with other skiers are an inherent part of the sport. Otherwise,
every skier on the slopes would be guilty of negligence every time he or she accidentally fell.
Clearly, a skier can be guilty of negligence if he or she skis recklessly or out of control and
endangers other skiers. However, when a simple fall is alleged, such conduct does not, as a
matter of law, constitute negligence.
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For example, in Thompson v. McNeill. 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990), the Supreme
Court of Ohio was faced with an analogous situation. The plaintiff was hit in the forehead
with a golf ball that had been struck by the defendant. The evidence established that defendant
had shanked the shot toward the plaintiff and had yelled "fore" in order to warn the plaintiff.
The plaintiff apparently did not hear such a warning and was struck. The court held that there
was no liability for injuries caused by mere negligent conduct between participants of sporting
events. The court stated:
Acts that would give rise to tort liability for negligence on a city street or
in a back yard are not negligent in the context of a game where such an
act is foreseeable and within the rules. For instance, a golfer who hits
practice balls in his back yard and inadvertently hits a neighbor who is
gardening or mowing the lawn next door must be held to a different
standard than a golfer whose drive hits another golfer on a golf course.
The principal difference is the golfer's duty to the one he hit. The
neighbor, unlike the other golfer or spectator on the course, has not
agreed to participate or watch and cannot be expected to foresee or accept
the attendant risk of injury. Conversely, the spectator or participant must
accept from a participant conduct associated with that sport. Thus, a
player who injures another player in the course of a sporting event by
conduct that is a foreseeable, customary part of the sport cannot be held
liable for negligence because no duty is owed to protect the victim from
that conduct. Were we to find such a duty between co-participants in a
sport, we might well stifle the rewards of athletic competition.
Id. at 707; See also Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995)(being
struck by a foul ball at a baseball game "is one of the natural risks assumed by spectators
attending professional games;" and beyond providing protection against such behind home
plate, stadium does not have a duty to protect spectators from foul balls careening into the
stands).
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In the ski collision case of Freeman v. Hale. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (1994), the
court reasoned similarly:
As a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to
others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another
person . . . . In the sports setting, however, conditions or conduct that
otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the
sport itself. Although defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate
(or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well
established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to
increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the
sport.
Id. at 1393 (quoting Knight v. Jewett. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 315-16 (1992)). Thus, the court
concluded that conduct is outside the range of ordinary activity involved in a sport "if the
prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor
otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport." Id. at 1394.
In the instant case, it is foreseeable to all skiers that other skiers on the slope may
fall. In fact, it is the rare individual who never falls while skiing. See McDaniel v. Powell.
26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Cal. App. 1962)(evidence at trial showing that "even expert skiers 'can go
out of control,' and that when skiers do so they may fall or they may ski out of control for a
distance before they fall; anyone who happens to be in the pathway of such may be hit").
Indeed, the Utah Legislature has enacted an "Inherent risk of skiing" statute. .See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-51 et. seq. (1997). The statute bars claims against a ski operator for injury
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing. Although in this case Ricci has made no
claim against the ski operator, the statute is significant in that the legislature specifically deems
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"collisions with other skiers" as an inherent risk of skiing. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52(1)
(1997)("Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part
of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to . . . collisions with other skiers.").
Falling while skiing is foreseeable. A person cannot be held liable for falling
because no duty is owed to protect other skiers from that conduct. When a person accidentally
catches his or her ski edge on the snow, an inherent risk of the sport is that that person may
begin to fall into another skier. Such is what occurred in this case. A skier does owe another
a duty to ski reasonably under the totality of the circumstances. However, there was no
evidence put forth at trial that Shoultz did not do so. Instead, the evidence merely
demonstrates that Shoultz accidently caught an edge which caused him to veer to his left and
begin to fall into Ricci's path. In summary, the following statement by the Utah Supreme
Court rings loud and true when applied to the facts of this case:
Not every accident that occurs gives rise to a cause of action upon which
the party injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands of
accidents occur every day for which no one is liable in damages, and often
no one is to blame, . . . .
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah 1996)(quoting Martin v. Safeway
Stores. Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977)). The trial court correctly granted Shoultz's
motion for j.n.o.v. when it found that Shoultz was not negligent as a matter of law.
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II. EVEN IF SHOULTZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO J.N.O.V., HE IS
ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE SUBSTANTIAL
COMPETENT EVIDENCE EXISTS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A
VERDICT IN HIS FAVOR.
The decision of the trial court to grant a new trial on the basis of insufficient
evidence, Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), will not be disturbed on appeal when the record contains
substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict in favor of the party moving for
a new trial. Braithwaite v. West Valley Citv. Corp.. 921 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1996). The
substantial evidence standard requires that evidence be "sufficient in amount and credibility
that, when considered in connection with the other evidence and circumstances shown in the
case, would justify some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds acting fairly thereon to
believe it to be the truth." Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell. 713 P.2d
55, 58 (Utah 1986).3 Although an appellate court determines that there was sufficient evidence
supporting a jury's verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, that does not preclude a finding
that substantial competent evidence exists for a verdict in favor of the moving party.

3

In Price-Orem. the Utah Supreme Court also stated:

To establish that the trial court erroneously granted a new trial . . . [the
nonmoving party] must marshal the evidence supporting [the moving
party's] case and demonstrate that such evidence is not sufficiently
substantial or credible to support a verdict in favor of [the moving
party].
Price-Orem Investment Co. 713 P.2d at 58. Ricci's brief fails to meet that requirement.
Nevertheless, this section of Shoultz's brief will set forth the evidence which would support a
verdict in his favor.
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Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1002. In this case, because substantial competent evidence exists for
a verdict in favor of Shoultz, this court should affirm the trial court's grant of a new trial.
A. SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT
SHOULTZ WAS NOT NEGLIGENT.
As argued previously with respect to Shoultz's argument that he was entitled to
j.n.o.v., there is simply no competent evidence upon which a jury could base a finding that
Shoultz was negligent. The evidence submitted by Ricci at trial merely showed that Shoultz
fell while skiing. There was no evidence submitted that Shoultz was out of control or in any
other way engaging in reckless or careless skiing. Instead, Ricci's testimony showed that
Shoultz accidently caught the edge of his ski on the snow. That caused his skis to split at the
tip and Shoultz veered to his left and began to fall. The two skiers, then, collided. (R. 59091, 668-69). The mere fact of falling while skiing does not constitute negligence. See supra
Point I.
In turn, Shoultz testified that he never caught the edge of his ski and he was not
falling when the collision occurred. (R. 810). Instead, Shoultz was halfway through the
runout when, without warning, Ricci hit him from behind on the back right side which forced
him into the trees. (R. 806-07). Shoultz hit the trees with his shoulders, his skis were under
him and when he hit the tree, the skis bent and "pitched" him backwards into the snow. (R.
811). At trial, Shoultz produced photographs of severe bruising on his right back side which
tended to confirm his testimony. Shoultz's medical records showed that he also sustained
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bruising on his left side, particularly his left front shoulder and left front thigh. Again, Shoultz
testified he hit the trees going forward with the primary force on his shoulders which would
explain the bruising on his left side. Shoultz did not take a picture of that bruising because by
the time he had photographs taken ten days after the accident, such bruising was gone. (R.
694). In other words, the impact to his right buttocks had been more severe than that to his
left shoulder and thigh and Shoultz's desire was to document the cause of the collision and not
the minor injuries to his left side which resulted from his tumble into the trees. That evidence
too, substantiates Shoultz's version of how the collision occurred.
Finally, the evidence concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code provides
substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor. The code is
a well publicized list of rules that is put together by the National Ski Area Association. Nearly
all ski resorts in the United States use it as a sort of "rules of the road." (R. 331): See Ninio v.
ffight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967)(plaintiff, the downhill skier, was injured when defendant
ran into her; jury entered verdict in favor of defendant finding no negligence; appellate court
remanded for new trial because trial court failed to instruct jury concerning rule that uphill
skier must yield to skiers below). Snowbird publishes the code on its "Skier's Guide" and also
posts it at the base of the ski lifts and some ticket sales locations. (R. 794). In order for Ricci
to obtain a Snowbird Season Ski Pass, he had to sign an agreement in which he stated that he
understood the code and would abide by it. (R. 436). The code provides in pertinent part:
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SKIER'S RESPONSIBILITY CODE
There are elements of risk in skiing that common sense and personal
awareness can help reduce.
1.

Ski in control or in such a manner that you can stop or avoid other
skiers or objects.

2.

When skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid
the skier below you .

(R. 602, 606; Attached herein as Addendum). Evidence at trial showed that Ricci failed to
adhere to the above provisions.4
As Ricci was descending Anderson Hill, he was behind Shoultz. Likewise, when
the collision occurred on the runout, he was behind Shoultz. Ricci testified that just prior to
the collision, he was 20 feet behind and 10 feet to the left of Shoultz. (R. 570, 587, 666-67).
Shoultz, therefore, was the "downhill" skier throughout the series of events and Ricci was the

4

Violation of a code, ordinance or statute, although not constituting negligence per
se, may be used as evidence of negligence. Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130, 1135 (Utah App.
1990); Intermountain Farmers Assoc, v. Fitzgerald. 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978). cert denied.
439 U.S. 860 (1978). Other jurisdictions have also recognized this general rule. See Rolick v,
Collins Pine Co.. 975 F.2d 1009, 1012-14 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert denied. 507 U.S. 973
(1993)(Expert witness allowed to testify concerning his opinion that defendant had failed to
cause a logging operation to be conducted in accordance with industry standards incorporated
in a regulation of OSHA; such testimony used as evidence of negligence); Martin v. Mapco
Ammonia Pipeline. Inc.. 866 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (D.Kan. 1994)(Evidence of compliance or
noncompliance with Pipeline Safety Act and OSHA is admissible in negligence action to show
applicable standard of care and defendant's conformity with that standard); Nehring v.
Lacounte. 712 P.2d 1329, 133-34 (Mont. 1986)(the violation of a statute, although not
negligence per se, nevertheless may be relevant in determining whether a defendant's conduct
was negligent by fixing a standard against which negligence can be measured).
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"uphill" skier. According to the code, Ricci had a duty to avoid Shoultz as the downhill skier.5
Ricci's only explanation for why he could not stop or avoid Shoultz was that he "didn't have
time." (R. 592-594). The only plausible explanation of why the two skiers collided, then, was
that Ricci was skiing too close to Shoultz. In other words, Ricci failed to ski sufficiently far
behind and/or to the side of Shoultz to be able to avoid Shoultz in the event Shoultz turned,
stopped or fell. The fact that Ricci was unable to stop or avoid Shoultz is competent evidence
that Ricci's failure was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus, would support a verdict
in Shoultz's favor.
Likewise, evidence adduced at trial showed that Ricci was overtaking Shoultz at the
time of the accident.6 At the top of Anderson Hill, Ricci saw Shoultz and the rest of his ski
class skiing in the middle of the catted portion of the bowl approximately 100 feet in front of
him. (R. 570). Ricci began to descend the hill on the left side of the catted portion. (R. 571.)
As Ricci approached the middle of the hill, he was approximately 75 feet behind Shoultz and
10-15 feet to his left. (R. 666-67). Upon reaching the bottom of the hill which flattens out
into the runout, Ricci was 20 feet behind and 10 feet to the left of Shoultz. (R. 587). Thus,

5

In his brief, Ricci makes the surprising argument that because the runout rises
slightly, Ricci was not skiing downhill. Thus, he could not be the "uphill" skier and the code
provision regarding the duty of the "uphill" skier does not apply to him. Common sense
dictates that his interpretation completely strains the meaning of the safety code.
6

At trial, Ricci testified that he was not overtaking Shoultz. (R. 606). However,
simply because there is competing testimony on this (or any other point) does not preclude a
finding that Shoultz presented substantial competent evidence supporting his position.
Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1002.
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Ricci had made up a distance of 80 feet as the skiers were descending Anderson Hill. In turn,
Shoultz testified that he was proceeding at approximately 5 m.p.h. and was skiing in a straight
course through the runout. Ricci testified that he was approaching Shoultz at a speed of 20
m.p.h. on the runout. The difference between the skiers' speed, then, was 15 m.p.h. and
Ricci, as the uphill skier was overtaking Shoultz not only on the steeper part of the hill, but on
the runout. In such a case, Ricci had a duty to avoid Shoultz and evidence at trail concerning
his failure to do so would support a verdict in favor of Shoultz.
In this case, Shoultz was not, as a matter of law, negligent. Under Ricci's theory
of the case, Shoultz merely began to fall when his ski caught an edge on the snow. Falling
while skiing is not negligent. Likewise, other substantial competent evidence was adduced at
trial which would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor. The evidence showed that Shoultz did
not catch and edge or begin to fall. Instead, Ricci ran into Shoultz from behind and on
Shoultz's right back side. Finally, substantial competent evidence was given at trial that Ricci
was both the "uphill" skier and the "overtaking" skier. As such, that skier "must avoid the
downhill skier below. . . . " A finding that Ricci was either the "uphill" or "overtaking" skier
would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor, because Ricci's actions would be the proximate
cause of the collision. If Shoultz is not entitled to j.n.o.v., then the trial court correctly
granted his motion for a new trial pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59(6) (1997).
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III. IF SHOULTZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO J.N.O.V. OR A NEW
TRIAL PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(6), HE IS ENTITLED
TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT EXCLUDED EXPERT TESTIMONY
CONCERNING THE SKIER'S RESPONSIBILITY CODE.
On an appeal of the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony, an appellate court
reviews whether the trial court abused its discretion. Steffensen v. Smith's Management
Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). The burden is on the complaining party to prove
that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the trial court
had allowed the expert testimony." Id. Because the trial court abused its discretion in this
manner and there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different had the
trial court allowed the expert testimony, Shoultz is entitled to a new trail.
Prior to trail, the court excluded expert testimony by Snowbird employees,
particularly, Bob Bonar, Snowbird's mountain operations manager, regarding the application
and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of this case. (R. 442). The
court only allowed Bonar to testify that the code was posted and published by Snowbird Ski
Resort. (R. 442, 793).7
The court did not allow Shoultz's experts to testify concerning the interpretation of
the code because Shoultz's counsel did not designate those witnesses as experts and the court
felt that Ricci was entitled to notice concerning expert witnesses. (R. 341). However, the trial

7

A jury instruction was given concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code. .See
Instruction No. 22 at R. 232). However, the jury was not permitted to hear testimony
regarding the application of the code to the facts of the accident.
23

court's scheduling order did not impose a deadline for the designation of expert witnesses. In
addition, the Snowbird employees, including Bonar, were asked question in their depositions
as to whether they had formulated any opinions as to the cause of the accident and whether the
respective parties had violated the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 331-32). Ricci had ample
warning that such opinions would be elicited from these individuals and could have, if he chose
to do so, investigated the possibility of retaining an expert to testify on his behalf concerning
the application of the Skier's Responsibility Code.
In addition, the trial court excluded the expert testimony on the basis that Shoultz
could not lay appropriate foundation to allow Bonar to testify as to the application and/or
interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 442).

Under Rule 702 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence, such testimony would be permissible. An expert witness is allowed to
testify if his testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding a particular issue. Bonar
was employed at Snowbird as the mountain manager. Prior to that, he was employed as the ski
patrol director and assistant mountain manager. (R. 789-90). As such, Bonar was extremely
well qualified in respect to the enforcement and implementation of the Skier's Responsibility
Code at Snowbird. Therefore, a proper foundation could have been laid to allow Bonar to
testify as to the application of the code in the particular context of this accident. Bonar would
have been able to testify that the uphill skier (Ricci) had a duty to avoid the downhill skier
(Shoultz), and that the uphill skier's failure to do so caused the accident.
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Again, Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows experts to testify if their
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
Bonar's experience and specialized knowledge concerning the application, interpretation and
enforcement of the Skier's Responsibility Code would have been a great assistance to the jury
in applying the code to the particular facts at issue in this case.
The fact that Bonar did not witness the accident is not dispositive. Bonar could
have offered testimony as to the application, interpretation and enforcement of the code based
upon the respective version of events presented by both Ricci and Shoultz. Bonar would not
have been asked to render an opinion as to whether Ricci was negligent. See Randle v. Allen.
862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1992); Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991), .eert
denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Instead, Bonar would have been asked to express an
opinion, based upon each party's version of the accident, whether the respective parties had
violated the Skier's Responsibility Code. An expert is entitled to testify as to whether a
particular party was in compliance with a particular code provision without opining as to
whether that individual was negligent. See cases cited supra n. 3.
Had the trial court allowed Bonar to testify concerning the application and
interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code, there is a likelihood that the jury verdict
would have been different. Apparently, the jury was confused as to the code's interpretation.
At trial, Ricci testified that the cause of the accident was that Shoultz lost control of his skis.
However, when a person falls while skiing, he or she naturally "loses control." .See McDaniel
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v. Powell. 26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Cal. App. 1962). That is not the same, as the Skier's
Responsibility Code provides, as a failure to "ski in control or in such a manner that you can
stop or avoid other skiers or objects." In other words, a skier does have a responsibility to ski
under control. A skier is not skiing "under control" if he or she is skiing excessively fast,
recklessly or carelessly. However, a skier can fall or "lose control" when not engaging in that
particular type of conduct. When a skier merely falls he or she is neither violating the Skier's
Responsibility Code nor negligent in doing so.
Had Bonar been able to clarify the above interpretation of the Skier's
Responsibility Code to the trier of fact, there remains a likelihood that the verdict would have
been different. If this Court determines that Shoultz was not entitled to j.n.o.v. or a new trial,
then Shoultz is entitled to a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing
expert testimony concerning the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility
Code. Ricci possessed notice of the expert testimony and proper foundation was available to
allow the experts, particularly Bonar, to testify concerning the application and interpretation of
the code to the facts of this case. That testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct when it granted Shoultz's motion for j.n.o.v. Shoultz
respectfully requests that this court affirm that ruling. If Shoultz is not entitled to j.n.o.v.,
then this court should affirm the trial court's ruling concerning the grant of a new trial.
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Substantial competent evidence was produced at trial which would sustain a verdict in his
favor. If Shoultz is not entitled to a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, then, because the trial court abused its discretion concerning the exclusion of expert
testimony on the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code, Shoultz is
entitled to a new trial. A substantial likelihood exists that had the trial court allowed that
testimony, the jury's verdict would have been different.
DATED this j ^ d a y of December, 1997.
STRONG & HANNI
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78-27-51

JUDICIAL CODE

78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy.
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number
of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly
contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that few insurance
carriers are willing to provide liability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in
recent years due to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent
in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law
in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that sport, to establish
as a matter of law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide
that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 1.
Meaning of <*this a c t " — The term "this
actw in the last sentence means Laws 1979,
Chapter 166, which appears as §§ 78-27-51 to
78-27-54.

Cross-References. — Hazards inherent in
mountaineering, skiing and hiking and hazards of area served by passenger tramways assumed by skier or sportsman, § 63-11-37.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355.
From Wright to Sunday and Beyond: Is the
Law Keeping Up With the Skiers?, 1985 Utah
L. Rev. 885.
Am. J u r . 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements
and Exhibitions § 81 et seq.

C.J.S. — 86 CJ.S. Theaters & Shows § 39 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Liability for injury or death from
ski lift, ski tow, or similar device, 95 A.L.R.3d
203.
Ski resort's liability for skier's injuries resuiting from condition of ski run or slope, 55
^ ^ I ? ^
^
.
Key Numbers. — Theaters and Shows «» 6.

78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing — Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which
are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to:
changing weather conditions, variations or steepness in terrain; snow or
ice conditions; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest
growth, rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other structures and
their components; collisions with other skiers; and a skier's failure to ski
within his own ability.
(2) "Injury" means any personal iiyury or property damage or loss.
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for the purpose of
engaging in the sport of skiing.
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area operator to be
used for skiing.
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their agents, officers,
employees or representatives, who operate a ski area.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 2.
Meaning of "this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51.
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78-27-53

NOTES TO DECISIONS
risks. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d
1037 (Utah 1991).
The determination of whether a risk is inherent is to be made on a case-by-case basis,
using the entire statute, not solely the list provided in Subsection (1). Clover v. Snowbird Ski
Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).

Inherent risk.
The term "inherent risk of skiing," using the
ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "inherent," refers to those risks that are essential
characteristics of skiing — risks that are so
integrally related to skiing that the sport cannot be undertaken without confronting these

78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing — Bar against claim or
recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in sport.
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 to the
contrary, no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area
operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 3; 1986, ch.
199, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assumption of risk.
Comparative fault.
Comparative legislation.
Duty to protect skiers.
Negligence.
—Design or maintenance or ski run.
—Supervision of employees.
Assumption of risk.
This statute is meant to achieve the same
results achieved under the doctrine of primary
assumption of risk. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
Comparative fault
Exempting suits concerning injuries caused
by an inherent risk of skiing from the comparative fault statute is consistent with the assertion that the ski area operators are not at fault
in such situations — that is, ski area operators
have no duty to protect a skier from inherent
risks of skiing. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort,
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
Comparative legislation.
The protections ski area operators possess
under § 63-11-37 are not more expansive than
the protections they possess under this statute.
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037
(Utah 1991).

Duty to protect skiers.
Beyond the general warning prescribed by
§ 78-27-54 a ski area operator is under no duty
to protect its patrons from the inherent risks of
skiing. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d
1037 (Utah 1991).
A ski area operator is under no duty to make
all of its runs as safe as possible by eliminating
the type of dangers that skiers wish to confront
as an integral part of skiing, such as powder,
moguls, and steep grades. Clover v. Snowbird
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
Negligence.
—Design or maintenance or ski run.
Evidence raised a genuine issue of material
fact, precluding summary judgment, in regard
to the allegedly negligent design and maintenance of a ski run that was alleged to create a
hazard to skiers. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
—Supervision of employees.
Evidence raised a genuine issue of material
fact, precluding summary judgment, as to
whether a ski area operator was negligent in
not supervising its employees in regard to the
practice of reckless skiing. Clover v. Snowbird
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
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78-27-54

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355.

78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing
inherent risks and limitations on liability.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing,
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4.
Meaning of tt this act." — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51.

78-27-55. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch.
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of

skiing and the statute of limitations on such
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1.

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, $ 1; 1988, ch. 92,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not
otherwise provided by statute or agreement"

following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); substituted "shall" for "may" following "the court"
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsection (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added
Subsection (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer.
Discretion of court
Essential elements.
Findings.
Frivolous appeal.
Hearing.
State of mind.

"Without merit" and "good faith."
Cited.
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer.
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not
show the bad faith necessary for an award under this section. Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 4l4 (Utah 1989).
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